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The Legal Void of Unpaid Internships: Navigating the
Legality of Internships in the Face of Conflicting Tests
Interpreting the FLSA
MADIHA M. MALIK

Unpaid internships have come under increased scrutiny for their
potential illegality under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Due to the
limited case law and statutory guidance regarding interns, lower
courts have issued conflicting opinions on the proper analysis courts
should engage in to determine whether interns are considered
“employees” under federal law. Such conflicting judicial
interpretation is detrimental to both employers and interns. A bright
line rule for determining when an intern qualifies as an employee
under the FLSA is critical to settling the uncertainty in this area of
the law.
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The Legal Void of Unpaid Internships: Navigating the
Legality of Internships in the Face of Conflicting Tests
Interpreting the FLSA
MADIHA M. MALIK
I. INTRODUCTION
For years, emerging professionals have coveted the opportunity to
expand their experiences, résumés, and networks with the help of
internships. While the work is often unpaid, it is undertaken with the
presumption that the opportunity will serve as a stepping-stone to their
prospective careers. However, recent lawsuits have brought the legality of
unpaid internships under scrutiny. In response to a slew of class action
lawsuits filed by former and current interns, courts have had to consider
whether interns fall within the category of “employee” under federal and
state labor laws, and as such, must be paid according to minimum wage
laws.1 Three areas of the law currently govern employment jurisprudence
for interns: the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the FLSA, and the Department of Labor’s Wage and
Hour Division (WHD) interpretive guidelines.2 These statutes and the
cases that interpret them have fallen short of providing a clear test for
courts and businesses to uniformly use in determining whether an intern is
an employee under federal labor laws.
The FLSA is the federal law that regulates wage and hour requirements
for employees and mandates that employees be paid at least the federal
minimum wage.3 The text of the FLSA is unhelpful in determining whether
an intern is an “employee” because the Act does not mention interns and


J.D. Candidate, The University of Connecticut School of Law, expected May 2016; B.A., The
George Washington University, 2011. Thank you to my family for their unwavering support and
encouragement, and to Professor Jon Bauer for his invaluable guidance.
1
See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(involving plaintiff interns bringing suit claiming they were “employees” under the FLSA and entitled
to compensation); Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (involving plaintiff
interns claiming that they were entitled to minimum wage compensation as “employees” under the
FLSA).
2
Bernice Bird, Preventing Employer Misclassification of Student Interns and Trainees, CORNELL
HR REV. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.cornellhrreview.org/preventing-employer-misclassification-ofstudent-interns-and-trainees/#_edn1.
3
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012).
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provides an inadequate and broad definition of “employee.” In 1947, the
Supreme Court interpreted the FLSA in Walling v. Portland Terminal
Company,5 which presented the question of whether “trainees” for a
railroad company were employees entitled to compensation.6 While the
Court found that the “trainees” were not employees under the FLSA, it
failed to establish a clear standard for analyzing whether an individual falls
within the definition of an “employee.”7 In 2010, the WHD issued
guidance in the form of a Six-Factor Test derived from Walling, designed
for employers to use in order to determine whether interns in a particular
program should be treated as employees and thus entitled to the minimum
wage.8 While the Six-Factor Test provides some guidance, the agency’s
interpretation lacks the force of law and is not binding on federal courts.9
As such, courts have given varying weight to the WHD’s guidance, with
some courts disregarding it all together.10
Ambiguous statutory language, unclear legal precedent, and nonbinding agency interpretation have resulted in courts’ applying inconsistent
standards to determine the employment status of interns. The emerging
tests are only controlling in the jurisdiction in which the respective federal
court sits, resulting in a patchwork of standards in courts across the nation.
Such inconsistency of legal standards across jurisdictions inhibits
multinational employers and courts from adequately assessing the legality
of unpaid internships and elucidates the need for a uniformly controlling
standard nationwide.
This Note discusses and critiques the limited guidance available
pursuant to the FLSA, the Supreme Court, and the WHD, as well as the
various legal tests that have emerged from their interpretations. It suggests
a test that courts, employers, and interns alike can apply in order to predict
4
See Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 492 (“[T]he term ‘intern’ is neither defined nor provided as an
exception in the FLSA . . . .”); infra Part III.A..
5
330 U.S. 148 (1947).
6
Id. at 150.
7
Id. at 153; compare Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1983)
(deferring to the DOL’s Six-Factor Test in determining the employment status of trainees), with Solis
v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (dismissing the DOL’s SixFactor Test as inadequate for determining the employee status of trainees), and Reich v. Parker Fire
Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding the DOL’s Six-Factor Test relevant but not
conclusive to determining a trainee’s employment status under the FLSA).
8
WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm
[hereinafter DOL FACT SHEET].
9
See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (stating that agency interpretations in
formats such as opinion letters are entitled to deference, but only if they are persuasive); Hoyt v. Gen.
Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that the federal courts of appeal were not bound by
explanatory bulletins promulgated by the WHD).
10
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the varied deference courts have afforded the WHD’s
interpretation of the FLSA as it relates to interns).
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the legality of unpaid internship programs. Part II provides an overview of
the market for interns and its evolution as it relates to both employers and
interns. Part III discusses the legal standards established by the FLSA, the
Supreme Court, and the WHD. Part IV sets out the conflicting tests that
have emerged from federal court decisions. Part V introduces two recently
litigated cases that are soon to be considered by the Second Circuit and
compares the courts’ distinct reasoning and decision in each case. Part VI
analyzes the ways in which courts can overcome the ambiguity of the law
and proposes several factors that should be taken into consideration in
formulating a workable solution.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNSHIP MARKET
High unemployment rates for recent college graduates have led to a
hyper-competitive job market, causing internships to become a highly
coveted way of getting one’s foot in the door.11 Internships provide realworld skills different from knowledge obtained in the classroom, making
graduates with internship experience more valuable candidates.12 Not only
do internships provide experience in particular areas of interest, they also
help develop “soft skills” such as communication and teamwork, which are
highly valuable to employers.13 Unpaid internships are particularly
desirable in fields where barriers of entry are particularly high and paid
internships are rare, including industries such as entertainment, public
relations, and publishing.14 Internships at times provide the prospect of a
11

PEW RESEARCH CTR., YOUNG, UNDEREMPLOYED AND OPTIMISTIC: COMING OF AGE SLOWLY,
(2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/young-underemployedand-optimistic.pdf (reporting that 54.3% of employed young adults between ages 18 to 24 were
employed in 2011, the lowest total since 1948, when the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics first started
collecting this data). Contributing to the competitive job market, the Pew Research Center reports that
more young adults are enrolled in high school or college today than at any time before in history and
that the job losses experienced in the aftermath of the Great Recession have compounded the
decreasing employment rate. Id. at 3, 6.
12
See Solis, 642 F.3d at 531–32 (placing special emphasis on intangible benefits interns derived
from the work, which taught them responsibility, the dignity of manual labor, the importance of
working hard, seeing a task through to completion, leadership skills, worth ethic, and other practical
skills); Jack Gault et al., Undergraduate Business Internships and Career Success: Are They Related?,
22 J. MARKETING EDUC. 45, 51 (2000) (stating that internship programs add real-world experience to
their education); see also infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the importance given to intangible skills in
assessing the benefits conferred to interns).
13
See Catherine Gewertz, ‘Soft Skills’ in Big Demand, EDUC. WK., June 2007, at 25, available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/06/12/40soft.h26.html (stating that it is not enough to be
academically strong because business leaders are increasingly valuing soft skills). Such intangible skills
have received attention in recent case law and are deemed to have significant value in assessing the
benefits derived from an internship. Solis, 642 F.3d at 531.
14
See Christopher Keleher, The Perils of Unpaid Internships, 101 ILL. B.J. 626, 627 (2013)
(listing industries where unpaid internships provide opportunities to learn and network); see also Eric
Gardner, How All Those Intern Lawsuits Are Changing Hollywood, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 16,
2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/how-all-intern-lawsuits-are-746945 (quoting Rick
IN A TOUGH ECONOMY 6
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full-time job at the end of the program. Employers also benefit from
unpaid interns because internship programs often serve as an important
pipeline feeding full-time hiring programs.16 Not only do interns provide
employers with a new and young perspective, employers benefit from
having time to train and get to know potential new hires before extending a
full-time offer, a practice that is known as “converting interns.”17
Disparities exist between paid and unpaid internships that result in
unpaid interns being overlooked for full-time jobs and being assigned
menial tasks as compared to their paid counterparts.18 Menial tasks that
provide few professional skills and appear closer to unpaid labor, rather
than meaningful learning opportunities, are largely the focus of disgruntled
interns who claim they have been exploited.19 Unpaid internships have also
been criticized for diluting the labor market, thereby replacing experienced
workers and hurting the U.S. economy.20 Finally, access to unpaid
Levy, partner and general counsel of at talent agency, ICM Partners, which was defending a class
action lawsuit brought by former interns, as stating “[t]here is a long, long tradition of intern programs
being an integral part of careers in Hollywood”); Generation i, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21615612-temporary-unregulated-and-often-unpaidinternship-has-become-route (stating that those employers most eager to provide unpaid internships are
those who are glamorous enough for students to agree to perform menial work without pay).
15
See, e.g., Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Hearst made it clear
that there was little likelihood, and certainly no guarantee, of a job at the end of their internship.”).
16
See NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, INTENSHIPS: CURRENT BENCHMARKS,
http://www.naceweb.org/internships/benchmarks.aspx (reporting that 79% of interns accepted full-time
job offers with the employers they held an internship with); see also David L. Gregory, The
Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
227, 241 (1998) (“Internships benefit employers in a myriad of ways; they provide free labor, fresh
perspectives, and a means to screen potential employees.”).
17
See generally Philip S. Rose et al., Converting Interns into Regular Employees: The Role of
Intern-Supervisor Exchange, 84 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 155 (2014) (studying the predictors of intern
conversion).
18
See NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, CLASS OF 2012: 60 PERCENT OF PAID INTERNS GOT
JOB OFFERS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.naceweb.org/s08012012/paid-intern-job-offer (reporting that
64% of paid interns received job offers compared to 38.3% of unpaid interns). Paid interns spend 42%
of their time on professional duties such as analysis and project management and only 25% on clerical
and non-essential functions, compared to unpaid interns who spend 30% of their time on professional
tasks and 31% of their time on clerical work. Id. The study suggests that this discrepancy between
unpaid and paid interns contributes to the disparity in job offers, with paid interns spending more time
engaging in “real work,” therefore gaining more relevant and valuable experiences than their unpaid
counterparts. Id.
19
See, e.g., Questioning the Ethics of Unpaid Internships, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 13, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128490886 (relaying the story of an NYU
student who, during an internship at an animation studio in New York City, was assigned to the
facilities department and carried out tasks including cleaning the kitchen and the bathrooms, and
cleaning doorknobs to prevent spreading of the H1N1 virus).
20
ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE BRAVE
NEW ECONOMY 71 (2012) (stating that the internship boom has most seriously effected the
displacement of regular employees, causing hundreds of thousands of full time, regular employees to
be laid off and potentially remain unemployed).
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internships is limited largely to those who can afford to take on unpaid
work, a luxury that is often unavailable to low-income students, making
them less competitive than their more affluent peers.21
III. UNCLEAR LEGAL STANDARDS
The FLSA is the primary federal law regulating wages and hours for
employees, and is enforced by the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division.22 Among other things, the FLSA mandates that employees be
paid at least the federally prescribed minimum wage.23 Since the FLSA
does not define or reference unpaid internships, their legality turns on the
Act’s definition of “employee.”24 If an intern, by virtue of his or her job
duties, does not meet the definition of “employee” under the FLSA, the
Act does not apply and the employer does not have to abide by federal
minimum wage requirements. However, if the intern does qualify as an
“employee,” the employer must comply with the FLSA’s minimum wage
and overtime provisions.25 As discussed below, determining whether an
intern is an “employee” under the FLSA is challenging given the broad
language of the statute, unclear judicial interpretation, and non-binding
agency guidance.
A. Statutory Language
The FLSA defines the term “employee” broadly as “any individual
employed by an employer.”26 The definition of “employer” is “any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.”27 The term “employ” is defined as “to suffer or permit to
work.”28 These expansive definitions were read by the Supreme Court to
be comprehensive enough to include an array of working relationships.29
The broad definition of “employee” and “employ” has resulted in the
21
KATHRYN ANNE EDWARDS & ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, ECON. POL’Y INST., NOT-SOEQUAL PROTECTION-REFORMING THE REGULATION OF STUDENT INTERNSHIPS, 3 (Apr. 9, 2010),
http://www.epi.org/publication/pm160 (reporting that the decision to take an unpaid internship depends
on a student’s “economic means, thus institutionalizing socioeconomic disparities beyond college”).
22
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–02, 204 (2012) (stating that Congress
created the Wage and Hour Division, under the direction of the Administrator, within the DOL to
administer and enforce the FLSA); WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION LETTER FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (May 24, 1994), 1994 WL 1004829; WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.dol.gov/whd/about/mission/whdmiss.htm.
23
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947).
24
See Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he term ‘intern’ is
neither defined nor provided as an exception in the FLSA . . . .”).
25
29 U.S.C. § 206.
26
Id. § 203(e)(1).
27
Id. § 203(d).
28
Id. § 203(g).
29
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947).
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30

Supreme Court loosely interpreting both terms, providing little guidance
regarding how they apply in the context of internships. The Court has
found the Act’s definition of “employ” to enlarge the meaning of
“employee,” thereby providing coverage for parties who might not
otherwise qualify as employees under a strict application of traditional
principles of agency law.31 Various tests have been developed to determine
the employment status of individuals under the FLSA depending on the
context in which the question of employment arises, for example with
regard to migrant workers32 and independent contractors.33 However a
uniform test for determining the employment status of interns under the
FLSA has yet to be developed.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Walling
The primary source of judicial interpretation for the term “employee”
in the internship context comes from Walling v. Portland Terminal
Company,34 in which the Supreme Court interpreted the rights of trainees
under the FLSA.35 The Court’s ruling in Walling gave rise to the
foundational concept that someone who is trying to learn the skills
necessary to perform the required functions of a job need not be treated as
an employee.36 This holding has been extended to interns who are, for
purposes of the FLSA, treated similar to “trainees.”37

30
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (stating that the term
“employ” has “striking breadth” in the FLSA).
31
Id.
32
See Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117–20 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that migrant pickle
harvesters were not “employees” under the FLSA and analyzing the potential employment relationship
with factors including the permanency of the relationship, the degree of skill required, the workers’
capital investment, the migrant workers’ opportunity for profit or loss, and the potential employer’s
degree of control).
33
In distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, courts focus on “whether, as
a matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent upon the alleged employer or is
instead in business for himself.” Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Scantland v. Jeffrey Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that when
determining whether an individual is an “employee” or an “independent contractor” exempt from the
FLSA, courts look to the “economic reality” of the relationship between the alleged employee and
employer and whether the relationship exhibits dependence); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d
1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the dominant factor in considering whether an individual is an
independent contractor or an employee, is the degree of economic dependence that the alleged
employee has on the business for which he or she is working).
34
330 U.S. 148 (1947).
35
See id. at 153 (holding that the trainees were not “employees” under the FLSA).
36
Stephen A. Mazurak, The Unpaid Intern: Liability for the Uninformed Employer, 29 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 101, 105 (2013).
37
See Anthony J. Tucci, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA to
Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1369 n.30 (2012) (“The
DOL practically adopted the trainee standard verbatim—only changing ‘training’ to ‘internship’ and
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In Walling, the employer railroad company required prospective hires,
or “trainees,” for the position of brakeman to undergo preliminary training
that lasted an average of seven to eight days.38 The Supreme Court held
that the trainees were not employees under the FLSA and were not entitled
to wages.39 In so holding, the Court reasoned that working for one’s own
advantage on another’s premises, without an express or implied
compensation agreement, did not automatically make an individual an
employee under the FLSA.40 Under this reasoning, interns who have no
expectation of compensation and work without pay for some other personal
benefit, such as building their résumés or networking, cannot automatically
claim to be employees within the scope of the FLSA.
The Walling Court found several factors relevant to its holding.41 First,
the Court noted that the trainees did not replace regular paid employees;
rather the regular employees did most of the work themselves, and stood
by to supervise the trainees.42 As such, the company did not benefit from
the trainees’ work because the trainees, rather than facilitating the
company’s business, at times impeded it.43 Second, the Court found it
significant that the defendant railroad company did not compensate the
trainees, nor did the trainees expect any compensation during the training
period.44
The Court concluded that the employer railroad received no
“immediate advantage” from the trainees’ work, and therefore the trainees
were not “employees” under the FLSA.45 In cautioning that its holding in
‘trainee’ to ‘intern.’”); DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (adopting Walling in formulating a guideline for
the legality of unpaid internships under the FLSA).
38
Walling, 330 U.S. at 149.
39
Id. at 153.
40
See id. at 152 (“The definition ‘suffer or permit to work’ was obviously not intended to stamp
all persons as employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for
their own advantage on the premises of another.”).
41
These factors were later adopted in the Department of Labor’s Six-Factor Test, infra Part III.C.
See DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (listing the criteria to be applied in determining whether an
individual is entitled to compensation or not).
42
Walling, 330 U.S. at 149–50. The yard crew would instruct the trainees, providing supervision
by first allowing them to observe routine activities and gradually allowing trainees to do actual work
under close scrutiny. Id. at 149.
43
Id. at 150.
44
Id. Those who passed the training were certified as competent and subsequently placed in a
pool of qualified workers available when the railroad company needed them. Id. Pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement, it was agreed that for the war period, the men who would later work
for the railroad company would be given a retroactive allowance of $4 per day for the training period.
Id.
45
Id. at 153. The Court’s analysis of the “immediate advantage” received by the employer has led
many courts to infer that this was the primary test established by the Supreme Court in employertrainee jurisprudence, despite the Court’s failure to formulate a bright-line test. See, e.g., Kaplan v.
Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Walling for the
proposition that when an individual’s work “provides no ‘immediate advantage’ for his alleged
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Walling might provide a way to evade FLSA minimum wage
requirements,46 the Court’s decision alludes to the recent claims of
employers unjustly categorizing employees as “interns” to bypass the
FLSA. While Walling did not present an issue of employers evading the
FLSA by employing beginners at less than minimum wage, the Court
noted that, “[i]t will be time enough to pass upon such evasions when it is
contended that they have occurred.”47 Such a time is upon us with the
current question of whether modern unpaid internships are legal under the
FLSA.
C. Administrative Guidance
Following the 2008 recession, the economy saw a dramatic increase in
the number of unpaid internships,48 prompting guidance for employers
from the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) on how
to properly handle the growing number of interns.49 In 2010, drawing from
the Court’s decision in Walling,50 the WHD issued a test that employers
were urged to use to determine whether hiring an intern without
compensation was legal under the FLSA.51 The DOL’s Six-Factor Test52
requires that in order for an unpaid internship to be considered lawful
under the FLSA:
‘employer’—he is not an ‘employee’ under the FLSA”); Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d
1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The rationale of [Walling] would seem to be that the railroad received no
‘immediate advantage’ from the trainees’ services.”).
46
See Walling, 330 U.S. at 153 (“We have not ignored the argument that such a holding may open
up a way for evasion of the law.”).
47
Id.
48
Josh Sanburn, The Beginning of the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME (May 2, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/05/02/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-unpaid-internship-as-we-knowit/. Unpaid internships began to increase in the 1970’s and 1980’s when the traditional norm of working
at one job for life was being moved away from and the development of human resources departments
allowed specialization of overseeing new hires and recruits, including interns. Id. The “Great
Recession” accelerated the increase of unpaid interns, and as of 2012, of the 1.5 million internships in
the United States, an estimated one-third to one-half are unpaid. Id.; see also supra Part II (discussing
the economy’s impact on the modern-day internship market).
49
Gregory S. Bergman, Unpaid Internships: A Tale of Legal Dissonance, 11 RUTGERS J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 551, 564 (2014).
50
WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FLSA2004-5NA, OPINION LETTER FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (May 17, 2004), 2004 WL 5303033.
51
DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8. These guidelines apply only to for-profit employers. Nonprofit employers are exempt from the criteria for unpaid internships and may hire unpaid interns as
volunteers without meeting the DOL’s requirements. Id. In 1996, prior to the publication of the DOL
Fact Sheet, the WHD articulated similar guidance in an opinion letter responding to an inquiry
regarding the FLSA’s application to interns. WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION
LETTER FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), 1996 WL 1031777 (May 8, 1996) [hereinafter 1996
OPINION LETTER].
52
This test is sometimes referred to as the “Walling Factors.” See, e.g., Summa v. Hofstra Univ.,
715 F. Supp. 2d 378, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
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1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation
of the facilities of the employer, is similar to training
which would be given in an educational environment;
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but
works under close supervision of existing staff;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern;
and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the
conclusion of the internship; and
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is
not entitled to wages for the time spent in the
internship.53
“If all of the factors of the test are met, an employment relationship
does not exist under the FLSA, and the Act’s minimum wage and overtime
provisions do not apply to the intern.”54 The WHD advises that the more an
internship program is structured away from the employer’s actual
operations, such as providing an academic experience or skills pertaining
to several employment settings, the more likely it is to be viewed as nonpaid work, acceptable for an unpaid internship.55 The WHD further
explains that interns engaging in productive work, such as clerical tasks or
other business operations, may still be viewed as “employees” entitled to
wages and overtime because the employer benefits from the interns’ work,
even if the interns are learning new skills.56
Though the Six-Factor Test is useful, the WHD’s guidelines are merely
discretionary, and courts are not bound by them.57 Despite the language in
the Fact Sheet suggesting that all six factors be strictly construed in every
case,58 recent lower court decisions have afforded varying degrees of
53

DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8.
Id.
55
See id. (stating that the more an internship program is structured around a classroom or
academic experience, the more likely the internship will be viewed as an extension of the individual’s
educational experience, and the more the internship program provides skills used in several
employment settings, the intern will most likely be viewed as receiving training).
56
Id.
57
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[I]nterpretations contained in formats
such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore, but only to the extent
that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’” (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944))); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing judicial deference to agency regulations and
interpretations of law).
58
See DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (“If all of the factors listed above are met, an employment
relationship does not exist under the FLSA . . . .” (emphasis added)).
54
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deference to the DOL’s Six-Factor Test, frequently discarding the agency’s
guidance and creating their own tests to determine when an unpaid intern is
an “employee.”59 The DOL Fact Sheet contributes to the confusion with its
introductory language: “whether an internship or training program meets
this exclusion depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of each such
program,”60 suggesting a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, which
seems to be at odds with applying each part of the DOL Six-Factor Test.61
Two recent cases filed by unpaid interns in the Southern District of New
York, Wang v. Hearst Corporation62 and Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Inc.63 discussed below,64 and the different tests used in each case, illustrate
the need to reconcile the standard for future cases.
IV. AGENCY DEFERENCE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF WALLING
The DOL’s Six-Factor Test has been widely criticized as being
confusing and contradictory; some courts have disregarded the test entirely
when analyzing the existence of employment relationships.65 Application
of the criteria is viewed as being challenging, difficult to prove, and highly
subjective.66 The Sixth Circuit stated:
[w]e find the WHD’s test to be a poor method for
determining employee status in a training or educational
setting. For starters, it is overly rigid and inconsistent with a
59
See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271–72 (5th Cir. 1982) (referencing other
courts’ attempts to develop tests directly from the language of the Court’s opinion in Walling); see also
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (drawing from a Tenth Circuit
case distinguishing an independent contractor and employee, concluding that the totality of
circumstances test was proper and that meeting five of the six DOL factors was sufficient to find that
there was no employment relationship); Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 787–88 (4th Cir. 1964)
(formulating three criteria including displacement of regular workers, whether the trainee was working
solely for his or her own benefit, and whether the company benefited from the trainee’s work); infra
Part IV.C (discussing the lack of agency deference by courts and judicial application of several tests
including the totality of circumstances test, the primary benefit test, and the immediate advantage test,
all drawn from Walling).
60
DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
61
Cf. Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (remarking on the confusion
produced by the language in the DOL Fact Sheet).
62
293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
63
293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
64
See infra Part V (discussing Wang and Glatt at length).
65
See Jason A. Cabrera & Sarah A. Kelly, Unpaid Internships: Training Ground or Legal
Landmine?, LAB. & EMP. OBSERVER (Cozen O’Connor), 2013, at 5, available at http://www.cozen.com
/Templates/media/files/LE_Observer1213.pdf (identifying the paradox that giving interns meaningful
work creates potential liability because the employer receives an immediate advantage from the intern’s
work while assigning menial tasks means putting the employer at risk of its actions being interpreted as
providing training similar to that given in an educational environment and displacing regular
employees).
66
Mazurak, supra note 36, at 103.
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totality-of-the-circumstances approach, where no one fact
controls . . . . Furthermore, the test is inconsistent with
[Walling] itself. . . . While the . . . six factors may be helpful
in guiding that inquiry, the . . . test on the whole is not.67
Despite criticism regarding the application of the DOL Six-Factor
Test, courts should give some deference to the DOL Fact Sheet, by virtue
of its publication by the WHD, the administrative agency that regulates the
FLSA.68
A. DOL Six-Factor Test Under Skidmore Deference
The Supreme Court has established that informal agency guidelines are
entitled to deference “only to the extent that [they] have the power to
persuade.”69 The persuasive power of a given guideline depends on “the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
[and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”70
The DOL Fact Sheet was issued by the WHD as an interpretive
guideline in response to requests from employers asking for clarification of
minimum wage requirements for unpaid internships.71 One of the WHD’s
functions is to issue non-binding bulletins and opinions interpreting the
FLSA.72 Courts have viewed DOL Fact Sheets as informal interpretations
subject to Skidmore73 deference, and therefore are only to be considered if
they are determined to be “persuasive.”74 The Supreme Court affirmed this
67
Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal
citations omitted).
68
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that an administrative agency’s
policies are entitled to respect).
69
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
70
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util.
Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (analyzing whether an agency’s interpretation applied technical
expertise on a complex matter with agency jurisdiction); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143
(1976) (analyzing whether the agency’s interpretation was consistent with earlier agency
pronouncements); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1971) (analyzing whether an agency’s
decision was well-reasoned).
71
See WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, RULINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (explaining that opinion letters are “in response to factspecific requests submitted by individuals and organizations”); see, e.g., 1996 OPINION LETTER, supra
note 51, at *1 (responding to an inquiry regarding application of the FLSA to interns).
72
Keleher, supra note 14, at 628.
73
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
74
Id. at 140; see Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1025–26 (10th Cir. 1993)
(applying the less deferential Skidmore standard to DOL Fact Sheet #71); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587
(finding the WHD’s opinion letter unpersuasive, and therefore did not require deference); Wang v.
Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 493–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Skidmore deference to DOL Fact
Sheet #71).
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position in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., a case where the
Court afforded Skidmore deference to the DOL’s interpretation of the
FLSA.76
While deference to informal agency guidelines is not required, the
Court has suggested that statutory interpretation in an opinion letter should
be accorded some deference.77 In Skidmore, the Court held that an
agency’s interpretation may merit some deference, whatever its form,
given the “specialized experience and broader investigations and
information” available to the agency,78 and given the value of uniformity in
its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires.79 An argument can therefore be made that Skidmore deference
should be afforded to the DOL Six-Factor Test, given the benefit of the
specialized experience that the DOL’s WHD can bring to bear on the issue
of defining internships within the FLSA.80 This argument, however, is
weakened because the DOL Six-Factor Test merely restates the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Walling.81 Absent independent agency procedure and
formal adjudication, the DOL Fact Sheet holds less persuasive force.82
Though some have suggested that ambiguity regarding the
employment status of interns should be resolved through agency

75

132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
Id. at 2168–69. The Court rejected the contention that Auer deference was warranted, stating
that such deference was only appropriate in cases where an agency’s interpretation is “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. at 2159 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77
See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (finding that it was not persuaded by the opinion letter’s
statutory interpretation). The Court differentiated between opinion letters, which are only compelling if
they have they have the “‘power to persuade,’” from interpretations that result from formal
adjudications or notice-and-comment rulemaking, which are afforded Chevron deference, mandating
that the agency interpretation be accepted by courts if “reasonable.” Id. at 586–87.
78
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
79
Id. at 140.
80
See, e.g., Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136 (1997) (finding that
reasonable agency interpretations have “at least some added persuasive force” where Chevron is
inapplicable); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (affording “some deference” to an interpretive
rule); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (stating that
“some weight” is due to informal interpretations though not “the same deference as norms that derive
from the exercise . . . of delegated lawmaking powers”).
81
See Opinion Letters from the Administrator, FLSA2006-12 (April 6, 2006), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_04_06_12_FLSA.pdf (“Based on [Walling], the
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has developed six factors to evaluate whether a trainee, intern, extern
apprentice, graduate assistant, or similar individual is to be considered an employee.”).
82
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (explaining that generally,
Congress has intended to give “administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force,” and therefore, Chevron deference has mostly been applied to
interpretations that resulted from formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking).
76
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83

rulemaking, the limited deference courts have afforded to the DOL SixFactor Test indicates the lack of persuasive force that the current regulation
has and that absent formal procedure, such a solution will likely be
ineffective.84 Therefore, judicial interpretation for the FLSA at the
appellate and Supreme Court level is required to provide clarity in this area
of the law and to dissipate the current legal void of unpaid interns.
B. Judicial Treatment of the DOL Six-Factor Test
Courts have afforded varying deferential weight to the DOL’s SixFactor Test.85 Along with expressly rejecting reliance on the DOL SixFactor Test,86 circuits have disagreed about the proper test to apply in order
to determine whether an internship qualifies for the “trainee” exception
established by Walling.
In Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District,87 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the trainee-employee distinction and held that the DOL factors
were “relevant but not conclusive” when determining whether a trainee is
an employee under the FLSA.88 In an action against a fire department for
wages allegedly owed to firefighters training in an academy prior to being
employed, the parties agreed that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test should be
applied, but disagreed as to which factors were necessary to satisfy the
83
See Kimberlee McTorry, Death of Unpaid Internships, the Rise of Social Equality: Legality of
Unpaid Internships Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 8 S.J. POL’Y & JUST. L.J. 47, 59–60 (2014)
(suggesting that the FLSA be amended to provide an apprentice exception); Jessica L. Curiale, Note,
America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need
for Change, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1553 (2010) (proposing rulemaking as the appropriate vehicle for
establishing an “intern-learner” exception to the FLSA for unpaid interns); see also Keleher, supra note
14, at 631 (proposing that the WHD revise the DOL’s Six-Factor Test to improve the test’s
practicability by providing flexibility for different sizes of companies). Others have suggested that the
Department of Education should be the agency regulating unpaid internships, instead of the Department
of Labor. See Patricia L. Reid, Fact Sheet #71: Shortchanging the Unpaid Academic Intern, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 1375, 1395 (2014) (suggesting that Congress should enact a law that delegates the power to
regulate unpaid academic internships to the Department of Education). While the concept of shifting
oversight to the Department of Education would align with the purpose of internships providing class
credit, this approach disregards internships that are not taken to fulfill course credits, but are merely to
gain experience and are not affiliated with an educational institution.
84
See Bergman, supra note 49, at 583 (stating that an updated WHD standard will not solve the
circuit split and will contribute to varying judicial interpretation, as well as suggesting instead that a
Supreme Court opinion would “provide the authority necessary to unite the circuits” and provide
guidance as to proper deference and analysis regarding the DOL Fact Sheet and the employment status
of unpaid interns).
85
See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Courts
differ on whether the WHD’s test is entitled to controlling weight in determining employee status in a
training context.”).
86
See, e.g., id. at 525 (rejecting the DOL Six-Factor Test as being at odds with Walling’s totality
of the circumstances and “primary beneficiary” standard).
87
992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
88
Id. at 1027.
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89

test. While the Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the plaintiffs, argued that
all criteria of the DOL Six-Factor Test must be met for the position to be
lawfully unpaid, the defendant fire department urged that the proper test
was the totality-of-the-circumstances, in which case it was not necessary
for all six of the DOL’s criteria to be met.90 The court reasoned that agency
regulations were not controlling on courts and that there was little support
that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test should be strictly applied in an “all or
nothing” approach.91 The Reich court concluded that the proper test was
the totality-of-the-circumstances.92 The court found that although the
trainees met five out of the six DOL criteria, this was insufficient to meet
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, thereby holding that the firefighters
were not employees entitled to compensation.93
In Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.,94 the Eleventh Circuit
first considered “the ‘economic realities’ of the relationship,” viewing the
DOL’s Six-Factor Test as a supplement to its analysis.95 Students in
medical billing and coding programs who had worked at unpaid
externships to meet graduation requirements alleged that they had received
minimal educational benefit from their externships and that the employer
benefited from their work.96 The court held that the employer received
little, if any, economic benefit from the work, and therefore the student
externs were not considered “employees” under the FLSA.97 The court
further stated that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test supported its conclusion but
was not controlling on courts.98 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Solis v.
Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc.99 applied Skidmore deference to
the DOL’s Six-Factor Test, stating that the factors were individually
helpful in guiding the inquiry regarding the employment status of interns,
but that the test as a whole was “a poor method for determining employee
status.”100
89

Id. at 1025–26.
Id. at 1026.
91
Id. (“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under [the
FLSA], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
92
Id. at 1026–27.
93
Id. at 1029 (concluding that a “single factor cannot carry the entire weight of an inquiry into the
totality of the circumstances” and therefore the trainees were not employees under the FLSA).
94
504 F. App’x. 831 (11th Cir. 2013).
95
Id. at 834–35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96
Id. at 832–33 (citing repetitive work assignments and a lack of formal structure in the program).
97
Id. at 834.
98
Id. at 834–35.
99
642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011).
100
Id. at 525 (stating that the test is unpersuasive, is inconsistent with Walling, and is a “poor
method for determining employee status”).
90
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Finally, in an outlier decision, Archie v. Grand Central Partnership,101
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
in an opinion by now-Supreme Court Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor
that the DOL Fact Sheet is entitled to Chevron deference.102 In applying a
mixed DOL Six-Factor Test and economic realities test, the court in Archie
held that because the DOL’s Six-Factor Test and the findings in Walling
take the same approach, the DOL’s Six-Factor Test is a reasonable
application of the FLSA and Walling, and is therefore controlling.103
C. Tests Emerging from Federal Court Decisions
As previously noted, federal courts have not agreed on a test with
which to determine the employment status of interns. Four tests have
emerged as a result of federal court jurisprudence: (1) the balancing benefit
test; (2) the economic realities test; (3) the totality-of-the-circumstances
test; and (4) the all-or-nothing DOL Six-Factor Test. Below is a discussion
of each test, in turn.
1. Balancing Benefits: Immediate Advantage or Primary Benefit Test
The primary benefit test originates from the second criterion of the
DOL’s Six-Factor Test, which asks whether “[t]he internship experience is
for the benefit of the intern.”104 The DOL further explains that if the intern
benefits by deriving “skills that can be used in multiple employment
settings, as opposed to skills particular to one employer’s operation,” it is
more likely that the intern will be regarded as a trainee.105 However, even
if the intern receives “some benefits in the form of a new skill or improved
work habits,” he or she may still be found to be an employee if the work
performed is largely clerical.106
The majority of federal courts have held that an intern is not an
employee unless the employer receives an immediate advantage or primary
benefit from the intern’s work.107 The Fourth,108 Fifth,109 Sixth,110 Tenth,111
101

997 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 532.
103
Id. at 531, 535.
104
DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209–10 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
proper test is whether the alleged employer or workers “principally benefited” from the orientation
program and that “[t]here [were] several facts that serve[d] to illustrate the relative degrees of benefit”);
Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971) (stating that Walling applied
an “immediate advantage” rationale, inquiring as to who was the principal beneficiary of the
“seemingly employment relationship”); Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 330 F.2d 785, 788 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding
it determinative that the employer’s interests were served by the workers and that the employer
“benefited from their labors”).
102
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112

and Eleventh Circuits have established that a balance of the benefits
analysis is the proper test for determining whether student interns, externs,
and trainees are employees under the FLSA.113
The dispositive question in a balancing of benefits analysis is whether
the intern or the employer was the primary beneficiary of the
relationship.114 Lower court jurisprudence has introduced an additional
consideration to the balancing of benefits analysis, namely that of tangible
and intangible benefits, which some courts have taken into account to
assess the benefits interns or alleged employees receive from performance
of internship duties.115 The Solis court, for example, placed particular
emphasis on the intangible benefits interns derived from their work,
including learning important skills related to responsibility, strong work
ethic, and leadership.116 Other federal courts have made similar
determinations,117 concluding that intangible benefits are “significant
enough to tip the scale of primary benefit in the students’ favor even where
the [employer] receives tangible benefits from the students’ activities.”118
108
See McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1209 (concluding that the proper test is whether the main
beneficiary of the trainees’ labor is the employee or employer).
109
See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he district court’s
balancing [of relative benefits] analysis appears to us to be more appropriate.”).
110
See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the existence of an employment relationship depends on “which party derives the primary benefit
from the relationship”).
111
See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1993) (“A number of
courts have . . . weigh[ed] the relative benefits to each party, and we are persuaded that conducting the
inquiry in this fashion is both permissible and helpful.”).
112
See Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2013)
(balancing the benefits to determine that two student externs were not employees because the training
was similar to that which would be provided to them in school, was related to the workers’ course of
study, and was a benefit to the students because they received academic credit for their work, thereby
stratifying graduation requirements).
113
See Solis, 642 F.3d at 529 (finding that the primary benefit test is the proper framework for
determining employee status).
114
Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 330 (2d Cir. 2012). Further, to determine who is the primary
beneficiary of a relationship requires balancing of (a) the tangible and intangible benefits derived by the
student, (b) the detriment to the employer, and (c) the benefit to the employer from the students’
activities. Solis, 642 F.3d at 526.
115
See Solis, 642 F.3d at 531–32 (agreeing that the intangible benefits “are of significant value”).
116
Id. at 531.
117
See Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering
intangible benefits along with other Walling factors. The court determined these intangible benefits to
include aiding participants to obtain jobs after the experience and would teach basic job skills including
timeliness, good attendance, working a full day, and punching a time clock). See also Kaplan, 504 F.
App’x. at 834 (considering the educational value of hands-on-work, receiving academic credit, and
that the externship made plaintiffs eligible for their degrees, along with several of the Walling factors);
Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (considering teamwork, responsibility,
accomplishment and pride along with whether the work decreased costs for the employer).
118
Solis, 420 F.3d at 532. The Solis court explained that the overall educational benefits, even if
intangible, should be considered. Id. at 532.
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Despite the application of the primary benefits test by circuit courts across
the country, the test has been criticized as being difficult to apply because
it is “subjective and unpredictable.”119
2. Economic Realities Test
The “economic realities” test assesses factors “including whether a
person’s work confers an economic benefit on the entity for whom they are
working.”120 This test has been adopted by the Second,121 Fifth,122
Eighth,123 Ninth,124 Tenth,125 and Eleventh126 Circuits. The Supreme Court
also applied the economic realities test in Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Coop., Inc.,127 where in assessing whether an employment relationship
existed between a cooperative and its members, the Court analyzed the
degree of control the alleged employer had over the workers, including
management’s ability to hire and fire workers.128 However, in Goldberg,
the Court avoided addressing the absolute use of the economic realities test
by stating, “if the ‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to
be the test of employment, these homeworkers are employees.”129 Walling
119
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Under this
[primary beneficiary] test, an employer could never know in advance whether it would be required to
pay its interns. Such a standard is unmanageable.”).
120
Kaplan, 504 F. App’x. at 834; see also Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468,
470 (11th Cir. 1982) (“It is well established that the issue of whether an employment relationship exists
under the FLSA must be judged by the ‘economic realities’ of the individual case.”).
121
See Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing as common ground
that courts must evaluate the “economic reality” when determining the existence of an employment
relationship).
122
See Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1553 (5th Cir. 1990) (“For purposes of FLSA,
determination of employee status focuses on economic reality and economic dependence.”); Usery v.
Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that in determining employment
status, economic realities are determinative).
123
See Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In determining whether an entity
functions as an individual’s employer, courts generally look to the economic reality of the
arrangement.”).
124
See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating
that the economic reality test includes inquiries into four factors including whether the alleged
employer has the power to hire and fire employees, supervises and controls employee work schedules
or conditions of employment, determines the rate and method of payment, and maintains employment
records).
125
See Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
economic realities of the relationship govern the inquiry of employment status); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d
802, 804 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the economic realities of the relationship govern and the focal
point is economic dependency on the business (citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 322 U.S. 126, 130
(1947))).
126
See Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2013)
(applying the economic realities test); Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 470 (11th
Cir. 1982) (analyzing the economic realities of an individual case).
127
366 U.S. 28 (1961).
128
Id. at 32–33 (holding that the workers were employees under the “economic reality” test).
129
Id. at 33 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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modified the “economic realities” test when it stated that despite the
economic realities of the relationship, when an individual works for his or
her own purpose, particularly when the work provides no “immediate
advantage” for his alleged employer, he or she is not an employee under
the FLSA.130
3. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
The totality-of-the-circumstances test originates from Walling and the
DOL Fact Sheet.131 Despite a lack of express statutory or Supreme Court
guidance regarding the applicability of the test, federal courts have
repeatedly held that the totality-of-the-circumstances test determines the
existence of an employment relationship.132
In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,133 decided four months after
Walling, the Supreme Court held that determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship does not depend on isolated factors, but
rather on the circumstances of the activity “as a whole.”134 In its decision,
the Court used the economic realities test as one of the factors in analyzing
the totality-of-the-circumstances, suggesting a totality of the economic
circumstances approach like the one proposed below.135 The majority of
lower courts seem to have adopted a similar approach.136 Under the
Rutherford standard, courts are required to look at all of the circumstances
of an alleged employment relationship to determine whether an intern is an
“employee” under the FLSA.
130
Kaplan, 504 F. App’x. at 834 n.1 (citing Walling’s explanation that the FLSA’s definition of
“employee” cannot be interpreted to make someone serving his own interest an employee of someone
who gives aid and instruction).
131
The totality of the circumstances is not included as one of the factors in the DOL Six-Factor
Test, but is in the language following the six criteria: “If all of the factors listed above are met, an
employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA . . . .” DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8.
132
See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the DOL Six-Factor Test is based on a totality of the circumstances approach).
133
331 U.S. 722 (1947).
134
Id. at 730.
135
Id. (referencing the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that the underlying economic realities
supported its determination and stating, “[w]e think, however, that the determination of the relationship
does not depend on such isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.”);
Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts will generally look to the
“economic reality” of the arrangement); see infra Part VI.C (discussing the totality of the economic
circumstances test as the appropriate test for intern-employee jurisprudence).
136
See, e.g., Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 330 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[E]conomic reality is
determined based upon all the circumstances . . . .”); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642
F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting an approach that “bypasses any real consideration of the
economic realities of the relationship and is antithetical to settled jurisprudence calling for
consideration of the totality of the circumstances of each case”); Reich, 992 F.2d at 1027 (basing the
court’s inquiry on the totality-of-the-circumstances test and the economic realities of the relationship);
Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1326–27 (10th Cir. 1981) (following the totality-ofcircumstances standard of Rutherford).
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4. All-or-Nothing DOL Six-Factor Test
A final All-or-Nothing Test has been suggested, requiring that each
element of the DOL’s Six-Factor Test must be met in order for an intern to
be exempt from “employee” status under the FLSA.137 While the language
in the DOL Fact Sheet calls for this approach, most courts have discarded
the all-or-nothing test in favor of a some-but-not-all-factors approach.138
The varying tests used across the circuits to determine whether a
trainee is an employee under the FLSA illustrates the lack of a uniform
standard that employers and courts can readily implement to determine the
legality of unpaid internship programs. Since the Walling decision in 1947,
the Supreme Court has not issued a definitive rule to determine when an
unpaid intern is in fact an employee. In light of the increasing litigation on
the issue of unpaid interns, the economic changes that have taken place
since Walling, and lower courts’ inability to clearly apply Walling when
determining the employment status of interns, the need for a bright line
rule has never been greater.
V. CASES ON APPEAL: WANG AND GLATT
Responding to a recent flood of lawsuits filed by unpaid interns, a
Second Circuit panel recently heard two cases concerning whether unpaid
interns at Hearst Corporation and Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. qualify as
employees under the FLSA, which would entitle them to back pay and
potential damages. Both cases were heard separately by the Southern
District of New York and were heard jointly on appeal by the Second
Circuit.139
A. Wang v. Hearst Corporation
The first of the cases on appeal, Wang v. Hearst Corporation,140
involves a class of plaintiffs who brought action against the magazinepublishing conglomerate, Hearst Corporation.141 The plaintiffs allege that
they are “employees” under the FLSA and New York Labor Law
(NYLL)142 and that they should have been compensated according to

137

Bird, supra note 2.
See DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8 (stating that all six of the DOL factors must be applied
when determining the legality of an unpaid internship); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing tests
adopting some parts of the DOL Six-Factor Test while determining that others are less significant).
139
Order Consolidating Appeals Dockets at 2, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 13-366
(2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2013).
140
293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
141
Id. at 490.
142
Id. at 492. NYLL uses the same standard for employment as the FLSA. Cano v. DPNY, Inc.,
287 F.R.D. 251, 260 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
138
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143

minimum wage requirements. Named plaintiff Xuedan “Diana” Wang
was a former Harper’s Bazaar intern who sought damages for five months
of unpaid labor in the magazine’s accessories department.144 Wang and her
co-plaintiffs145 worked as unpaid interns at several of Hearst’s magazines.
Despite earning course credit, Wang said in a Huffington Post interview
that the internship was far from an educational experience.146
Wang reportedly worked forty to fifty-five hours a week as “head
intern,” supervising several other unpaid interns carrying bags to and from
PR firms and served as a messenger service for the magazine.147 Like many
unpaid interns, Wang was pursuing her childhood dream of a career in the
fashion industry at her favorite magazine.148 After completing the
semester-long internship, Wang’s supervisor declined her request for a
letter of recommendation, criticizing Wang for mistakes she had made
during her time working for the magazine.149 After reading the DOL Fact
Sheet, Wang reportedly realized that the magazine had been treating her
and other unpaid interns inappropriately, prompting her to file suit.150
At trial, the court found it important that the plaintiffs understood prior
to their internship that the position was unpaid and that Hearst had
conveyed that there was no guarantee that the internship would lead to a
full-time job.151 While both parties agreed that the interns performed some
duties that were similar to those of paid employees, Wang and Hearst
disputed the amount of supervision provided to the interns and the benefits
that Hearst derived from the interns.152
The parties also disagreed as to the appropriate test for defining an
“employee” under Walling.153 The plaintiffs sought partial summary
143
Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 490, 492 n.3 (explaining that circuit courts have held that the NYLL
applies the same employment standard as the FLSA, and that while the court’s analysis was based on
the FLSA, it is nonetheless applicable to the NYLL).
144
Alice Hines, Fashion Week 2012: Unpaid Internships Questioned After Diana Wang’s
Harper’s Bazaar Suit, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02
/14/fashion-week-2012-unpaid-internships_n_1274181.html.
145
Wang’s co-plaintiffs worked for Hearst publications including Cosmopolitan, Marie Claire,
Esquire, Redbook, and Seventeen. Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 491–92. The interns worked in varying
capacities including as a bookings intern, editorial intern, fashion intern, sales intern, and beauty intern.
Id. at 491.
146
Hines, supra note 144. Wang reportedly carried out menial tasks with little to no supervision.
Id. She worked long hours and if something went wrong, Wang took the blame. Id.
147
Id.; see also Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 491 (listing Wang’s duties as including functioning as a
contact between editors and public relations representatives, conducting online research, cataloguing
samples, maintaining the accessories closet, and creating story boards).
148
Hines, supra note 144.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 492.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 492–93.
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judgment based on the “immediate advantage” standard, arguing that
Hearst received a direct benefit from the plaintiffs’ unpaid work.154 The
plaintiffs argued in the alternative that Hearst failed to meet all of the
criteria in the DOL’s Six-Factor Test.155 In opposition, the defendant
argued for “a ‘balancing of the benefits test,’ which looks to the totality-ofthe-circumstances to evaluate the ‘economic reality’ of the relationship.”156
Hearst disputed the plaintiffs’ contention that all of the elements of the
DOL’s Six-Factor Test must be met, and further argued that judicial
deference need not be afforded to the test, criticizing it as “a rigid
checklist.”157
Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York interpreted Walling’s
totality-of-the-circumstances test to be controlling in determining whether
the plaintiffs were “employees” under the FLSA and viewed the DOL Fact
Sheet as merely a “framework for an analysis of the employee-employer
relationship.”158 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reading of Walling, that
the “presence of an immediate advantage alone creates an employment
relationship,” stating that “[t]here is no one-dimensional test; rather, the
prevailing view is the totality-of-the-circumstances.”159 The court cited
support for its decision in a Second Circuit opinion affirming the totalityof-the-circumstances test.160
The district court in Wang avoided application of the totality-of-thecircumstances test, stating that the competing standards argued by each
side was enough to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the plaintiffs’
status as “employees,” and therefore denied the plaintiffs’ motion for
partial summary judgment.161 The court further explained that applying the
DOL Six-Factor Test presented a genuine dispute of material issues of fact
with respect to the first, second, third, and fourth factors of the test,162
based on which a reasonable jury might return a verdict favorable to
154

Id. at 493.
Id.
156
Id. at 494.
157
Id. at 493.
158
Id. at 493–94.
159
Id. at 493.
160
Id. (“[W]hether an employer-employee relationship exists does not depend on ‘isolated factors
but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’” (quoting Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308,
326 (2d Cir. 2012))). The Velez court further noted that a key consideration in the analysis depended on
who received the primary benefits from the relationship. Velez, 693 F.3d at 330.
161
Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 494.
162
Id. at 494. First Factor: “The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be given in an educational environment.”
DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8. Second Factor: “The internship experience is for the benefit of the
intern.” Id. Third Factor: “The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under close
supervision of existing staff.” Id. Fourth Factor: “The employer that provides the training derives no
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern and on occasion its operations may actually be
impeded.” Id.
155
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Hearst, supporting denial of partial summary judgment.
Discussing the DOL Six-Factor Test, which the plaintiffs claimed the
defendants failed to meet, the Wang court stated that the test was unclear
regarding the appropriate weight to be given to each factor.164 Furthermore,
the court stated that the introductory language of the DOL’s test is
confusing as it suggests a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, stating
that a determination of employment under the FLSA “depends upon all of
the facts and circumstances of each such program.”165 In dicta, the court
explained that despite the unclear application of the DOL’s Six-Factor
Test, the test is entitled to some deference because the test was conceived
by the WHD, which administers the FLSA, the federal law under which the
plaintiffs brought suit.166
Following the trial court’s decision, the plaintiffs in Wang filed an
appeal to the Second Circuit, which was granted certiorari and will be
heard jointly with Glatt, explained below.167
B. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc.
One month after the Wang decision, Judge Pauley of the Southern
District of New York decided the same issue of whether unpaid interns
were “employees” under the FLSA in the case Glatt v. Fox Searchlight
Pictures, Inc.168 In Glatt the court expressly found that unpaid interns
working on film production for various motion pictures “were classified
improperly as unpaid interns and [were] ‘employees’ covered by the FLSA
and NYLL.”169 Named plaintiff Eric Glatt worked on production of the
film “Black Swan” in New York, pursuing his passion for entertainment.170
Glatt had an MBA and was employed in the financial sector for years
before deciding to change careers.171 After taking a film editing course and
becoming certified, Glatt took the opportunity to work on a high budget
film with hopes of realizing his dreams, but was instead assigned to the
film’s accounting department.172 As an unpaid intern in the accounting
163
Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 494. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification due to lack
of commonality among the policies or practices each magazine held with regard to interns. Id. The
court adjourned the trial sine die. Id. at 498.
164
Id. at 493.
165
Id. (quoting DOL FACT SHEET, supra note 8).
166
Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493–94. The court cites United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234
(2001) for the proposition that “an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information . . . and given the value of
uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires.” Id. at 494.
167
Order Consolidating Appeals Dockets, supra note 139, at 2.
168
293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
169
Id. at 534.
170
Id. at 522; Gardner, supra note 14.
171
Gardner, supra note 14.
172
Id.
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department, Glatt was in charge of timesheets, analyzing reimbursements,
and delivering paychecks, all without any compensation.173
At trial, Glatt and his co-plaintiffs moved for summary judgment,
alleging that they were “employees” under the FLSA and should have been
compensated according to federal minimum wage requirements.174 While
the plaintiffs argued that they fell outside of the Walling “trainee”
exception, the trial court side-stepped this inquiry, stating that the issue had
not been addressed by the Second Circuit.175 The defendant urged for the
application of a primary benefit test, but the court disagreed, finding that
the test had little support in Walling and criticizing the test as being
“subjective and unpredictable,” making it an undesirable standard to
apply.176
The Glatt court found instead that the Six-Factor Test had support in
Walling and was entitled to deference because it was promulgated by the
WHD, the agency designated to administer the FLSA and its application.177
In its analysis, the Glatt court applied all of the elements of the DOL’s SixFactor Test, but emphasized that the test required the consideration of all
circumstances, with no single factor controlling.178 Applying the DOL SixFactor Test, the court found that: (1) the plaintiffs generally did not receive
formal training or education during their internships;179 (2) Fox Searchlight
Pictures Inc. was the primary beneficiary of the relationship because it
received the benefit of unpaid work that they would have otherwise had to
pay regular employees for;180 (3) the plaintiffs displaced regular employees
because without the plaintiffs performing the tasks for free, a paid
employee would have been needed to carry out the same duties;181 (4) Fox
173

Id.
Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 530–31.
175
Id. at 531.
176
Id. at 531–32. “Under [the primary beneficiary] test, an employer could never know in advance
whether it would be required to pay its interns. Such a standard is unmanageable.” Id. at 532.
177
Id. at 532. While both Wang and Glatt note the deferential value of the WHD’s opinion, as the
enforcement arm of the FLSA, Glatt seems to give more deference to the WHD than Wang, which
stated that the DOL Six-Factor Test, though entitled to deference, was simply a “framework for an
analysis.” Wang, 293 F.R.D. at 493–94.
178
Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.
179
See id. at 532–33 (stating that while the record for Glatt was unclear on the first factor, his coplaintiff Alexander Footman conclusively did not receive formal training or education during his
internship and that learning through the experience was not enough).
180
Id. at 533 (finding that benefits including résumé improvement, job references, and knowledge
of the workings of a production office are incidental to working in the office, in either a paid or unpaid
capacity, and are not related to academic or vocational training, as the WHD envisioned in this factor of
the DOL test).
181
Id. (finding that the plaintiffs carried out routine tasks that the defendant would have otherwise
had to pay a regular employee to perform). These “routine tasks” included gathering documents for
personnel files, picking up paychecks, and collecting managers’ signatures. Id. Glatt’s supervisor stated
on the record that had Glatt not performed the duties he was assigned was an unpaid intern, another
174
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Searchlight conceded that it received an immediate advantage from the
plaintiffs’ work because otherwise, their tasks would have been performed
by paid employees and the defendant’s business was never impeded by the
plaintiffs;182and (5) the plaintiffs knew they were not entitled to jobs at the
end of their internships and understood that the internships were unpaid.183
After analyzing all six parts of the DOL Six-Factor Test, the Glatt
court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the interns
were misclassified and were in fact employees under the FLSA.184 Among
the factors the court considered were that the interns performed the work of
paid employees, provided an immediate advantage to the employer,
performed basic tasks that did not provide educational or technical
training, and any benefits that the interns received were not educational.185
The court distinguished Glatt from Walling, in which the “trainees
impeded the regular business of the employer, worked only in their own
interest, and provided no advantage to the employer.”186
Both the Wang and Glatt courts utilized the “totality of circumstances”
test and the DOL’s Six-Factor Test, but weighed each standard differently.
Whereas the Wang court found the totality-of-the-circumstances test to be
controlling and viewed the DOL’s Six-Factor Test as merely an added
framework for analysis, Glatt applied the DOL Six-Factor Test as its
primary analytical tool and supplemented with the totality of circumstances
analysis, rejecting the primary beneficiary test.
Wang and Glatt, illustrate the federal courts’ varying interpretations of
the FLSA based on the Walling decision and the DOL Six-Factor Test, and
the glaring need for a uniform standard. On November 26, 2013, a Second
Circuit panel agreed to hear appeals for Wang and Glatt jointly.187 Given
the varying tests applied in each case, one of the two questions on appeal is
a clarification of the appropriate legal standard for determining whether an
unpaid intern is an “employee” entitled to minimum wage under the
FLSA.188

paid production assistant or regular staff member would have had to work overtime to complete the
tasks. Id.
182
Id. at 534.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Order Consolidating Appeals Dockets, supra note 139, at 2.
188
Plaintiffs-Respondents’ Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal at 4–5, Glatt v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 13-4481 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 2013).
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VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
With the Second Circuit Court of Appeals having jointly taken up the
appeals in Wang and Glatt,189 some guidance on the issue of the internemployee distinction is likely on the horizon. Considering the statutory,
legislative, and judicial history discussed above, there are two operating
principles that courts and legislatures should consider when resolving
questions about unpaid internships under the FLSA. Among the factors
that courts should take into account when proposing a new standard are the
competing and mutually dependent interests of employers and interns. A
careful balancing of employers’ need for predictability in avoiding legal
liability and interns’ need for protection from being taken advantage of is
necessary to reach a workable solution for the legal and industrial
communities as well as students and prospective interns.
A. Predictability for Employers
Court decisions based on varying tests severely impede employers’
ability to predict liability. Using different tests to determine whether
interns are “employees” under the FLSA poses a challenge to businesses
that rely on predictability, uniformity, and efficiency. These circuit court
tests are controlling only within those courts’ jurisdictions and do not bind
employers across the nation. This contributes to employers’ inability to
apply the appropriate legal standard and construct lawful internship
programs. While many have sought advise from law firms on steps to take
to avoid liability,190 judicial establishment of a uniform test is necessary to
ensure consistent application of the FLSA with regard to the employment
status of unpaid interns.
Some lower courts have considered the employer’s ability to predict
liability for providing unlawful unpaid internships in determining which
test to use in analyzing whether an intern is an “employee” under the
FLSA. For example, in Glatt, the trial court found that the “primary
benefit” test was unmanageable because employers could not determine in
advance whether to pay their interns because of the unpredictable and
subjective nature of the primary benefit inquiry.191
Employers found to be in willful violation of the FLSA open
themselves up to prosecution by the Attorney General and fines of up to
189
Ben James, Labor and Employment Cases to Watch in 2015, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/601418/labor-and-employment-cases-to-watch-in-2015.
190
E.g., Jeff P. Dunlaevy, “Research Me a Cup of Coffee and a Cinnamon Scone!”: Unpaid
Internships Pose Major Legal Risks, but Are Law Firms Exempt?, 25 S.C. LAW. 44, 48 (2014)
(suggesting guidelines to assist law firms and other private employers in establishing legally compliant
internship programs).
191
Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532.
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$10,000 or imprisonment for up to six months, or both. Interns who are
found to be “employees” are entitled to damages including back wages
liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, as well as appropriate equitable relief,
the boundaries of which are undefined.193 Such liability has the potential of
being financially taxing, particularly for employers faced with class action
lawsuits, in which payouts multiply depending on the number of plaintiff
interns.194 The cost of legal liability for unpaid internships has become
apparent in the recent settlements that have been reached in class action
complaints filed by interns, which in one case amounted to a total of $6.4
million.195
Without reliable legal standards to determine the legality of unpaid
internships, businesses and employers who would otherwise provide
opportunities for unpaid internships have a strong incentive to discontinue
their programs.196 Conversely, if some employers value their internship
programs enough to continue providing them, but are overly cautious and
risk-averse, they may convert all of their unpaid internship positions to
paid internships, when it might not be necessary to do so. While some have
recommended employers adopt such an approach,197 the over-provision of
paid internships will contribute to an extra cost for businesses, undoubtedly
stunting companies’ rate of growth and discouraging the provision of
internships all together or providing fewer internships opportunities. The
potential discontinuation or lessening of internships can be avoided by
providing clarity in the law, specifically by way of a test that can be easily
applied by businesses.

192

29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (2012).
Id. §§ 216(a)–(b). Alternatively, interns can file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor who
has authority to bring legal action against employers and recover similar damages to backpay, other
equitable damages, and attorney’s fees. Id. § 216(c).
194
See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[E]mployers are
governed . . . by the demands of the market place and by their own specialized needs.”); see also
Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Court Approves Condé Nast $5.85 Mln Intern Pay Settlement, REUTERS (Dec.
29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/29/condenast-interns-idUSL1N0UD1LE20141229
(stating that the settlement applies to roughly 7,500 interns who had worked for defendant’s magazines
and each of the former interns who worked at Condé Nast from June 2007 to the present are expected
to receive payments ranging from $700 to $1,900 each).
195
E.g., Daniel Miller, NBCUniversal to Settle Suit by Former Interns for $6.4 Million, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-81764733/ (stating that
NBCUniversial agreed to settle a class action lawsuit with thousands of interns claiming they should
have been paid for their work).
196
See NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS, UNPAID INTERNSHIPS: A SURVEY OF THE NACE
MEMBERSHIP 4, 5 (2010) (stating that the DOL’s Six-Factor Test has likely caused “a chilling effect on
all internships because employers [are] frightened by the increased scrutiny”).
197
See Keleher, supra note 14, at 628 (suggesting the best way for employers to avoid legal
liability is to treat all interns as employees and pay them the minimum wage).
193
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B. Protection for Interns
The divide between the courts and the DOL has created a “legal void”
in which interns are neither volunteers exempt from the FLSA, nor
employees protected by the FLSA.198 Some suggest that recent cases such
as Wang and Glatt have revealed a larger trend in the business community
of mislabeling individuals to evade obligations under the FLSA.199 In this
case, since the term “intern” is not included in the FLSA, employers
labeling positions as “internships” would fall outside the regulatory void of
the WHD. In Walling, the Court warned of such evasions and stated that
one of the FLSA’s purposes is to increase opportunities for gainful
employment.200 Internships, both paid and unpaid, are an important vehicle
in today’s job market and often provide the necessary learning experience
that employers frequently require.201 Internships also provide a learning
and skill-building opportunity unavailable in the classroom setting.202
The benefits of internships in today’s competitive job market puts
employers in a position of power and renders interns vulnerable to
exploitation and unwilling to voice concerns regarding abuses of power.203
Furthermore, businesses are in a position of power with respect to
internships because the majority of for-profit employers will stay in
business without them.204
C. Totality of Economic Circumstances Test Should be Applied
In deciding whether an unpaid internship is legal under the FLSA, the
three bodies of law regarding the employment status of internships (the
FLSA, Walling, and the DOL Fact Sheet) illustrate a common concern for
determining who benefits economically from the business relationship in
the internship setting.205 Many of the tests used by courts have been
198

David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 245

(2002).
199
See James, supra note 189 (referencing a growing trend among businesses to evade FLSA
obligations).
200
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151 (1947).
201
Gregory, supra note 16, at 241.
202
See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)
(describing testimony of alumni that the leadership skills and work ethic developed through the
school’s practical training program was “highly valuable in their future endeavors”).
203
Peter W. Fulham, Unpaid Interns and Labor Laws: Gaining Experience, Enduring Abuse,
POL. DAILY (May 12, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/12/unpaid-interns-labor-lawsstudents-experience-abuse/ (recounting instances of interns expressing reluctance to report abuses in
order to maintain good relationships with employers).
204
Mazurak, supra note 36, at 118.
205
See, e.g., Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc. 473 F. Supp. 465, 476 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)
(determining that X-ray technicians-in-training enrolled in a two-year accredited college program were
employees because the defendant benefited economically from the work performed by the trainees by
charging patients at full rates).
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criticized as being subjective and overly rigid, thereby preventing the
courts from applying an analysis tailored to varying internship
structures.206 While some have advocated for a totality-of-thecircumstances test that complies with Walling,207 such a test would provide
an employer with little guidance on how to structure an internship program
capable of satisfying this subjective approach. The totality-of-thecircumstances test, while referenced by both the WHD in the DOL SixFactor Test and Walling, requires a framework with which to analyze the
entirety of the circumstances. The economic realities test provides such a
framework and has support in judicial precedent.
The totality-of-the-economic-circumstances test analyzes the entirety
of the circumstances when determining the economic realities of a
relationship. The proper test for unpaid internships should be whether: (1)
the worker is not independent and receives constant direction and
supervision, and (2) the worker is receiving academic credit or other
tangible benefits for the internship. Under the proposed test, if these factors
are not met while taking into consideration the totality of the
circumstances, the intern must be paid.
These factors have significant support in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Though federal circuit courts are split regarding the use of the economic
realities test,208 the Supreme Court has twice indicated a preference for the
economic realities test.209 First, in Rutherford, the Supreme Court
effectively added the totality of circumstances analysis to the economic
realities test, thereby establishing the totality-of-the-economiccircumstances-test.210 Second, in Goldberg, the Supreme Court applied the
economic realities test but failed to state that the test was the primary
206
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that the
primary benefit test is “subjective and unpredictable” and “unmanageable” for employers); Solis, 642
F.3d at 525 (stating that the all-or-nothing approach is “overly rigid”).
207
Cody Elyse Brookhouser, Note, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to Determining
Whether Interns Are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 769–
71 (2015).
208
Compare Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1982) (omitting the
economic realities test from its analysis of the status of trainees as employees), with Reich v. Parker
Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that the court must evaluate the
economic reality of the relationship between the employer and the individual).
209
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); Rutherford Food Corp.
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947).
210
Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730–31 (affirming the Tenth Circuit’s application of the economic
realities test but stating that the determination depends on the circumstances of the whole activity).
Such a test is patently different from a balancing-economic-advantages-test proposed by some. See
Natalie Bacon, Unpaid Internships: The History, Policy, and Future Implications of “Fact Sheet #71,”
6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 67, 92 (2011) (proposing adopting a test balancing the
economic advantages of parties, which would compare the experience received by the intern and the
benefit the employer received from the internship through a comparison of the per-hour cost to the
employer of the intern and the per-hour benefit to the employer of an intern).
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vehicle for determining the employment status of an intern. Lower
courts have since repeatedly found that whether an individual is an
employee or not is determined by the “economic realities” of the potential
employment situation, which requires consideration of the totality-of-the
circumstances.212
The economic realities test would more accurately assess the legality
of unpaid internship programs. Goldberg’s economic realities test requires
consideration of functional aspects of a potential employment relationship,
including the worker’s independence, the method of compensation, and the
principal’s authority over the worker as opposed to technical concepts.213
The worker’s independence implies the requirement of supervision and the
compensation method should include assessing whether the internship is
for course credit or simply provides “soft skills” benefits, which can be
learned at any job.214 This test suggests that the greater control the
employer has the greater the likelihood that the intern is an employee under
the FLSA.
The factors in the proposed test are supported by the WHD in favoring
internship programs that provide a “classroom or academic experience,” as
the WHD views such opportunities as an extension of the intern’s
education.215 However, simply stating that the experience should be similar
to training that would be provided in an educational environment does not
ensure that the desired standard will be met. More guidance is required as
to what a sufficient educational environment entails. The first factor of the
proposed test, that the worker is not independent and receives constant
direction and supervision provides a two-fold benefit. First, it provides
guidance for the employer regarding what resources are required in order
to provide a classroom-like experience, satisfying the first part of the DOL
Six-Factor Test. Second, it ensures that an unpaid intern does not displace
an otherwise paid worker, satisfying the third part of the DOL Six-Factor
Test. The first prong also engages in an analysis of the economic realities
of the relationship, ensuring that the intern’s work is not being used to save
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on the cost of hiring a paid worker, thereby allowing the employer to
benefit unjustly. In Walling, the Court looked favorably upon the railroad
company’s supervision over the trainees when determining that the trainees
did not displace regularly paid workers and were not employees.216
The second prong of the proposed test, that the unpaid intern be
provided academic credit or other tangible benefits, addresses the DOL
Six-Factor Test’s first part—of receiving training that would be given in an
educational environment—and the second part, which concerns the
internship experience being for the benefit of the intern.217
The proposed test, while not fool-proof, does have precedential support
in Walling and the DOL’s Six-Factor Test and provides for a fact-based
inquiry allowing all parties to easily determine whether the internship falls
outside of the confines of the FLSA’s definition of “employee.” Interns
who are given clerical work without supervision, even when receiving
academic credit or tangible benefits, will be able to determine when they
are being used for productive work that is not academic in nature, allowing
them to assert their rights and demand fair treatment. Similarly, employers
using this guidance will be able to structure unpaid internship programs to
ensure constant supervision similar to that in the academic environment
and that the intern is receiving a tangible benefit that will provide skills
useful in their career trajectories if the student is not receiving academic
credit. Finally, the proposed test allows courts to engage in a fact intensive
inquiry while still providing some flexibility through a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unpaid internships are a nationally prevalent and span various
industries, necessitating a uniform legal standard for assessing their
legality under the FLSA. The totality-of-the-economic-circumstances test
is such a standard. It provides employer predictability, protects interns
against exploitation, and accounts for the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the FLSA and the DOL’s guidance. The economic realities test, assessed in
light of the total circumstances of the situation, is a fact-based test relying
on the functional aspects of an internship, allowing for a clearer and more
comprehensive standard for businesses, interns, and courts to apply. In
considering the appeal of the Glatt and Wang cases, the Second Circuit
should strongly consider the totality-of-the-economic-circumstances test as
an applicable standard that is favorable to all parties involved in current
and future litigation concerning unpaid internships under the FLSA.
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